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ARTICLES
CONVERTING RETAINED LAWYERS INTO
APPOINTED LAWYERS: THE ETHICAL AND
TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Gerald F. Uelmen*
I. THE SCENARIO
The enactment of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984'
gave federal prosecutors a potent new weapon: the ability to remove
retained counsel from the defense by seeking forfeiture of his or her
fee. The Act provides that the proceeds of a criminal enterprise be-
long to the government, and the government's ownership relates back
to the time the proceeds were acquired. Thus, a lawyer who agrees
to defend one accused of operating a criminal enterprise faces the
risk that the outcome of the case may include a determination that
his or her retainer belongs to the government. The burden this im-
poses upon a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has been
addressed in several recent cases2 and articles.' The purpose of this
article is to explore some of the ethical and tactical implications of
one of the "solutions" proposed for this dilemma: to simply appoint
retained counsel to continue representing the defendant pursuant to
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).4 The issue arises in
O 1987 by Gerald F. Uelmen
* Dean and Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., 1962,
Loyola Marymount University; J.D., 1965, LL.M., 1966, Georgetown University.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 301, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837,
2040.
2. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Estevez, 645
F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wisc. 1986); United States v. Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
3. Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Rais-
ing the Stakes, 22 AM. CRitM. L. REV. 707 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Reed]; Landers, Attor-
ney Fee Forfeiture: Can It Be Justified? Yes, 1 CRIM. JUST. 8 (1986) [hereinafter Landers];
Taylor & Strafer, Attorney Fee Forfeiture: Can It Be Justified? No, 1 CRIM. JUST. 9 (1986).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Other alternatives proposed as "solutions" to the dilemma in-
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the context of the following scenario:
Lawyer accepts a $50,000 retainer to represent Client who
is the target of a federal grand jury investigation of cocaine traf-
ficking. One month later, a federal indictment is handed down,
charging Client with engaging in a "continuing criminal enter-
prise" (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, and seeking for-
feiture of all proceeds of that enterprise, including any funds
paid as attorneys' fees. Lawyer moves to dismiss the allegations
seeking forfeiture of attorneys' fees. In denying the motion, the
trial court enters an order providing:
(a) Lawyer is appointed to represent client pursuant to the
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. §
3006A, with all CJA payments to be returned to the govern-
ment if Client's funds are available to compensate Lawyer.
(b) The trial is bifurcated, to require separate determina-
tion of the factual issues relating to guilt or innocence and the
factual issues relating to forfeiture of attorneys' fees.
This scenario has actually been suggested as one answer to the
quandary created by forfeiture of attorneys' fees in "guidelines" is-
sued by the U.S. Department of Justice.5 By the simple expedient of
appointing the lawyer who was retained, the client can be assured of
continued representation by the lawyer of his choice, while the law-
yer is assured that he or she will be compensated regardless of the
outcome of the case. If the lawyer declines the appointment, another
lawyer can be appointed, since the right to counsel does not guaran-
tee the appointment of counsel of choice. Thus, the dilemma is
resolved by treating the right to counsel as a fungible commodity.
The bifurcation of the trial is suggested as a means of avoiding
the problem of the lawyer's conflict in having an interest in the out-
come of the transaction he or she is litigating. In upholding the
constitutionality of forfeiture of attorneys' fees, U.S. District Judge
David Edelstein wrote:
The court notes that there is a potential conflict between the
dude: (1) Insure that the monies or assets used to pay for legal fees were acquired prior to the
defendant's alleged criminal conduct and have no nexus to the criminal charges. Reed, supra
note 3, at 777; (2) Require the client to sign documents stating that the money did not come
from illicit sources. Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Law-
yer, 1 CRIM. JUST. 2 (1986); (3) Require that the client provide reasonable assurances that the
fee comes from a legitimate source and have the client agree to waive the lawyer-client privi-
lege with regard to information concerning the source of the fee. Landers, supra note 3, at 48.
These alternatives also raise tactical and ethical implications.
5. Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, § 9-111.210; 38
C0RiM. L. RPTR. 3001-02 (Oct. 2, 1985).
[Vol. 27
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interest of counsel and his client regarding the specific assets
that would be subject to forfeiture. The attorney's interest
would be for the preservation of his fees while the client would
seek to preserve his own assets. See People v. Csabon, 103
Misc. 2d 1109, 1110, 427 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(attorney who had agreed to pay fine for convicted client was
disqualified from arguing motion to reduce or vacate the fine);
D[isciplinary] R[ule] 5-101 (lawyer should refuse employment
when his own interests may impair his independent professional
judgment); D[isciplinary] R[ule] 5-103 (lawyer should avoid the
acquisition of an interest in the cause of action or subject matter
of litigation he is conducting for his client). This conflict may be
avoided either by bifurcating the trial or through the use of civil
forfeiture provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 881. Defendant could retain
or be appointed independent counsel to represent his interests at
the forfeiture proceeding. This procedure would protect the de-
fendant's right to conflict free counsel, while enabling the gov-
ernment to obtain the fruits of the alleged narcotics enterprise.0
There are a number of practical problems with this scenario. First, it
is not clear that courts have the power to appoint lawyers for defend-
ants who are "prospectively" indigent under the CJA.' Second, CJA
rates are limited to maximum hourly rates of $60 in court, $40 out
of court,' and maximum compensation per case of $2,000.' Third,
there is no provision to compensate appointed counsel for representa-
tion of a client during the grand jury investigation preceding indict-
ment,'0 or for a civil forfeiture proceeding following conviction."
Fourth, if counsel retained for the criminal trial has a conflict in
6. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839, 850 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
7. The court is required, "after appropriate inquiry," to find that the defendant "is
financially unable to obtain counsel." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b). Appointment of counsel is also
authorized upon a finding "that the person is financially unable to pay counsel whom he had
retained." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). An argument in favor of the appointment of counsel by the
court analogizes the financial inability brought about by a forfeiture situation to that where a
defendant cannot hire a lawyer because "all available funds are subject to a superior, contin-
gent claim, and a private lawyer will not accept the risk of nonpayment. Cf United States v.
Kelly, 467 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1972)," such as where all available funds have been used to
post a bond. Landers, supra note 3, at 12.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1).
9. Id. at § 3006A(d)(2). The maximum can be waived for "extended or complex repre-
sentation" upon approval of the chief judge of the circuit, id. at § 3006A(d)(3), but courts
generally refuse to compute excess compensation at the maximum hourly rate. See, e.g., United
States v. Hildebrant, 420 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a); cf United States v. $2,500 in U.S. Currency, 689 F.2d 10
(2nd Cir. 1982); Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1985).
1987]
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litigating the forfeiture of his fee, how can the same conflict be
avoided by another attorney "retained" to litigate the forfeiture? For
purposes of this inquiry, however, these practical problems will be
ignored and this paper will focus on the ethical dilemma the scenario
presents. Can retained counsel accept an appointment under these
circumstances? Can retained counsel refuse an appointment under
these circumstances?
II. ACCEPTING THE APPOINTMENT
The acceptance of a client by a lawyer involves a complex set of
professional and personal judgments. Regardless of whether the
client has been directly approached by the lawyer, or has been prof-
fered by an appointing court, the lawyer cannot and should not
accept a client unless he or she concludes that:
(1) He or she possesses "the learning and skill ordinarily
possessed by lawyers in good standing who perform, but do not spe-
cialize in, similar services";"2
(2) He or she has adequate time to pursue the matter with rea-
sonable diligence. "When an attorney takes on more than he can
properly handle, he jeopardizes both his client's cause and the public
interest in sound and efficient administration of justice";"
(3) The intensity of any personal feeling of repugnance for the
client will not impair the effectiveness of representation of the
client;14
(4) The employment is not adverse to a client, a former client,
the lawyer's own self-interest or any other conflicting interest;
15
(5) Representation of the client is not likely to result in an un-
reasonable financial burden on the lawyer."
Under the scenario described above, the lawyer has already con-
sidered these factors and accepted the client at the time the retainer
was paid. The subsequent government effort to forfeit the retainer,
however, requires re-evaluation of the fourth and fifth
considerations.
12. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6-101(1) (1975), quoted in Lewis v.
State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 683, 621 P.2d 258, 170 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1981). Cf MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
13. Lopez v. Larson, 91 Cal. App. 3d. 383, 400, 153 Cal. Rptr. 912, 922 (1979). Cf
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(c) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1979).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); CAL. RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 4-101, 5-101-02 (1987).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2(b) (1983).
[Vol. 27
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The fourth consideration requires the lawyer to assess the con-
flict of interest created by the need to litigate his or her right to the
negotiated fee at the same time the guilt or innocence of the client is
being litigated. There are actually three aspects to this conflict: the
conflicting self-interest in payment of the agreed-upon fee, the con-
flicting roles of advocate and witness in litigating the forfeitability of
the fee, and the potential prosecution of the attorney for use of the
money received. None of these conflicts will be obviated by con-
verting the lawyer from "retained" counsel to "appointed" counsel.
Although an appointment will assure that counsel will be com-
pensated at CJA rates, the agreement to compensate counsel at the
retained rate cannot be invalidated. If the defendant is acquitted, his
right to utilize his assets to compensate his attorney will not be af-
fected. Thus, the use of forfeiture provisions against attorneys' fees
simply converts any agreement to compensate counsel into a contin-
gency agreement, the contingency being the successful acquittal of
the defendant.
While contingency fees are permitted in some circumstances,
their prohibition in criminal cases is absolute. The ABA Model
Rules carry forward the prohibition previously contained in Discipli-
nary Rule 2-106(C) of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "A
lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect
a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case." The obvious reason for this prohibition is that a contingency
fee arrangement poses an inherent conflict of interest between the
client and the lawyer. The conflict has been illustrated by a case
which bears a strong analogy to fee forfeiture. In United States ex
rel. Simon v. Murphy,17 an attorney agreed to represent a woman
accused of murdering her husband, with the understanding that his
fees would be paid from the proceeds of the husband's life insurance
policy. Since the policy benefits would be paid only if she was ac-
quitted, the fee was rendered contingent on a full acquittal. The po-
tential conflict became a real one when a plea bargain for a plea to
second degree murder was offered. Since counsel would receive no
fee if the bargain was accepted, his conflicting self-interest precluded
competent advice to the client on the desirability of accepting the
bargain:
It is at once apparent that Kramer's contingent fee ar-
rangement was valueless unless his client was acquitted. A plea
of guilty would not only destroy relatrix' right to the insurance
17. 349 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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proceeds, but also counsel's hope for further compensation. It is
hard to imagine a more striking example of blatant conflict be-
tween personal interest and professional duty ...
A conflict of interest arises where the lawyer is faced with
the task of giving advice to the client on optional courses of ac-
tion where the lawyer stands to benefit personally from the
adoption of one course to the exclusion of the other. Translated
into specifics, we hold that here Kramer's contingent fee agree-
ment created a conflict between his personal interests and those
of his client. To put it bluntly, by advising the persistence in a
not guilty plea, Kramer had nothing to lose but his client's
life.1"
Because of this conflict, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus
invalidating the conviction.
The contingency of forfeiture of the attorney's fee in the event
of conviction presents essentially the same conflict. The similarity
was recognized by U.S. District Judge Pierre N. Laval in construing
the CCE and RICO forfeiture provisions to preclude forfeiture of
attorneys' fees:
A lawyer who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic as
to take the business would find himself in inevitable positions of
conflict.... He might furthermore be found to have accepted a
contingent fee in a criminal case in violation of D[isciplinary]
R[ule] 2-106(C), since his retention of his fee would depend on
gaining an acquittal in the client's trial. The statute would give
attorneys a motive to negotiate a guilty plea that did not involve
forfeiture, rather than fight the case expending valuable time
and increasing the risk of incurring forfeiture.1
The only effect appointment of counsel has on this conflict is to
adjust the lower parameter. Instead of a "$50,000 or nothing" con-
tingency, the gamble becomes "$50,000 or $2,000." The difference is
hardly significant.
The acceptance of an appointment under these circumstances
not only subjects the client to a potential conflict of interest with his
lawyer, it also puts the lawyer in jeopardy of professional discipline
for violating a clear professional mandate. Unlike other potential
conflicts which the client can waive, the prohibition of contingent
fees in criminal cases is absolute."0
18. Id. at 823.
19. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
20. In re Steere, 217 Kan. 276, 536 P.2d 54 (1975); Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377,
543 P.2d 881 (1975).
[Vol. 27
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The second aspect of the conflict posed for counsel is the conflict
of roles between advocate and witness. The forfeiture of attorneys'
fees presents several factual issues which require the retained attor-
ney's testimony for resolution. How much was paid in fees? By
whom was it paid? What information did the attorney have about
the source of the funds? These issues make any attorney who agrees
to represent the defendant an essential witness to his prosecution,
regardless of any subsequent appointment by the court. Continued
representation under these circumstances would violate Rule 3.7 of
the ABA Model Rules, which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
The second exception is designed for situations in which attorneys'
fees are an element of the recovery sought, and the attorney is testi-
fying on behalf of his client. The rationale for Rule 3.7 has been
explained in these terms:
The basis for the professional rule regarding appearance as
both advocate and witness is twofold. First, it is designed to pro-
tect the integrity of the advocate's professional role by preserv-
ing the distinction between advocacy, which is based on reason
and subject to objective evaluation, and testimony, which is
based on the witness's moral qualifications and is evaluated in
terms of individual credibility. . . .Second, it is a corollary to
the rule that an advocate may not inject personal belief as to
cause into argument before the jury. The proscription against
appearing as advocate and witness eliminates the opportunity to
mix argument and fact."l
This rationale necessitates a prohibition which cannot be overcome
by client consent. Thus, the appearance of a lawyer in the dual role
of attorney and witness against the client would deprive the client of
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded in Uptain v.
United States: "No lawyer could function as a persuasive advocate
21. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEMS &
MATERIALS 236 (2d ed. 1983 Supp.) (quoting Final Draft Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Appendix Legal Background Rule 3.7 Commentary (1983)).
1987]
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before a jury when he is the crucial witness against his own cli-
ent.". Giving counsel a CJA appointment does not remove these
issues or alleviate the conflict. Neither does the bifurcation of the
trial or use of civil forfeiture provisions. Counsel is still put in a
position of having to ultimately appear as a witness against his or
her client. This conflict hampers the representation of the client long
before counsel is called to the witness stand. As described by U.S.
District Judge John L. Kane, Jr.: "The threat of an attorney having
to disclose information obtained from his client will chill the open-
ness of those communications, thereby impinging on the right to
counsel."2 s
A third aspect of the conflict of interest posed for counsel arises
from the risk of his own prosecution for use of the money received as
his fee. The continuing criminal enterprise statute contains a crimi-
nal prohibition of the direct or indirect use or investment of monies
which constitute the proceeds of drug violations.2" While this prohi-
bition applies only to those who "participated as a principal" in the
violation which produced the proceeds, an attorney whose relation-
ship with the client precedes the current retainer may face a
significant risk of prosecution.
The possibility of having to defend against a criminal charge
creates a potential conflict in penal interest as to evidentiary disclo-
sures regarding the transfer of monies and information. Where the
presentation of evidence may equally affect the penal interests of
both defendants and defense counsel, a cognizable conflict may occur
under the fifth and sixth amendments."
Thus, in reconsidering whether representation of the client is
adverse to the lawyer's own self-interest after a forfeiture is alleged,
a lawyer who accepts an appointment is agreeing to represent con-
flicting interests and to perform conflicting roles. The conflict does
not even appear to be the kind of conflict that a client can waive."
However, the lawyer must also re-assess the fifth and final con-
sideration. Will representation of the client result in an unreasonable
financial burden on the lawyer? Ultimately, the answer to this ques-
22. 692 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1982).
23. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 854.
25. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 135-39 (3rd Cir. 1984); See Reed,
supra note 3, at 778 n.179.
26. Even if the conflict could be waived, the right to choice of counsel is compromised if
the only choice given the defendant is to proceed with his chosen lawyer burdened by a conflict
of interest, or proceed with another lawyer who is not so burdened.
[Vol. 27
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tion may turn on the lawyer's willingness to compromise the
standards he or she ordinarily sets for himself or herself. The re-
tained lawyer can set his or her own standard of competence, as long
as it does not fall below the constitutional minimum. The standard
of competence for appointed counsel is externally imposed.
Every lawyer who accepts a court appointment to represent a
client makes a commitment to provide "competent" representation.
Obviously, there is a quantitative and qualitative difference between
the minimal demands of "competency" and the elaborate steps that
many retained counsel take to prepare and try a case. Just as a
Volkswagen and a Rolls-Royce can both provide transportation to a
given point, a deputy public defender one year out of law school can
provide "competent" representation to the same extent as Edward
Bennett Williams. The problem arises, however, when an attorney
who accepts a case with the understanding that he is being hired to
provide a Rolls-Royce defense is given a Volkswagen budget. The
financial resources available always impose a limitation on tactical
options. Options that retained lawyers consider essential may be
viewed as unnecessary extravagances by appointed counsel, or more
to the point, by the judges to whom appointed counsel must present
their requests for compensation and reimbursement of expenses. As
Justice Harry Blackmun once stated: "In any event, a rich defendant
may have the right to waste his money on unnecessary and foolish
trial steps, but that does not, in the name of necessary constitutional
equality, give the indigent the right to squander government funds
merely for the asking."'27 The dilemma, of course, is that retained
counsel who accepts appointment is, in reality, agreeing to lower his
or her standards. A judge in charge of the public purse might view
those "higher" standards as an "unnecessary and foolish" squander-
ing of money, but a lawyer committed to presenting the best defense
that resources will permit is applying a different measure.
A lawyer might avoid the dilemma by convincing himself/her-
self that the risk of being limited to appointive rates is low enough to
be acceptable. If the defendant is acquitted, of course, the agreed
upon retainer can be retained. Thus, the lawyer can provide the
same standard of representation, facing the prospect of financial ruin
only if the client is convicted. Every retained lawyer who accepts
appointment faces that gamble.
27. Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1969).
1987]
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III. REJECTING THE APPOINTMENT
While the courts have occasionally asserted the power to compel
a lawyer to accept court-appointed clients over his or her objection,"
it appears clear that the CJA confers no such power on the federal
courts. In Ferri v. Ackerman," the U.S. Supreme Court held that
attorneys appointed to represent indigent clients in federal criminal
proceedings are not entitled to the absolute immunity from malprac-
tice claims conferred upon judges and prosecutors. In so holding,
however, the Court noted that it was "not implausible" that the in-
creased risk of such liability in indigent cases might deter lawyers
from taking such appointments. Significantly, the Court avoided the
problem by assuming lawyers were free to decline such appoint-
ments. Noting that the risk of malpractice liability must be offset by
the level of compensation offered to ensure a steady supply of law-
yers, the Court left that equation for Congress to resolve."
Evaluating the factors by which a lawyer determines whether to
accept a client requires a form of intensive self-assessment and ex-
amination of conscience that only the lawyer involved can perform.
The courts must presume that this professional judgment is made in
good faith. If a lawyer's assessment of his own competency, existing
workload, intensity of personal feelings, potential conflicts, or current
financial ability is to be second-guessed and overridden by an
appointing court, the effectiveness of the ensuing attorney-client rela-
tionship may be doomed from the start.
The necessity for courts to defer to the good faith judgments of
attorneys who seek to decline appointment has been recognized in
the reported decisions of Florida and Ohio. In Easley v. State, 1 the
Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment of contempt
against a lawyer who filed a client's affidavit concurring in the law-
yer's own assessment of incompetence after the trial court denied a
previous motion to withdraw. 2 The trial court interpreted counsel's
action as "a scheme to secure release from appellant's obligation as
an attorney to assist the court in the representation of indigent crimi-
nal defendants."" On appeal, the court concluded that counsel who
believes himself incompetent to represent a client, despite a court or-
28. E.g., State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981). See Uelmen, Sim-
mering on the "Backburner": The Challenge of Yarbrough, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 285 (1985).
29. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
30. Id. at 204-05.
31. 334 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1976).
32. Id. at 635.
33. Id.
[Vol. 27
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der to provide such representation, has a duty "to communicate his
feelings of lack of competence" to the client:
There is no finding, nor indeed on the evidence could there be,
that appellant did not in good faith feel his inadequacy to han-
dle felonies. Moreover, in accord with the ethical obligations of
an attorney, we think it was incumbent upon appellant to com-
municate his feelings of lack of competence to the defendant."'
The Florida court recognized that a lawyer's own conclusions
about his competency, his conflicting loyalties, his availability, his
solvency, and his feelings of repugnance are likely to interfere with
the lawyer-client relationship, regardless of the fact that an ap-
pointing court may disagree with those conclusions:
The court's finding of appellant's competence in criminal
matters wouldn't make it a fact; and nothing in the evidence
impeaches appellant's assertion to the contrary. Furthermore,
appellant never actually refused to represent [defendant] in con-
travention of the court order. He simply informed the defend-
ant, as he should have, that he felt incompetent to represent him
and thereafter filed a motion consistent with the desires of his
client. He could have done no less and is not guilty of contempt
for doing so."
A similar dilemma was presented to the Ohio Court of Appeals
in State v. Gasen.36 There, the trial court appointed a deputy public
defender to represent a criminal defendant over the lawyer's objec-
tion that he could not effectively represent the client and that to do
so would violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, because the
defendant was already represented by another lawyer who had failed
to appear. Significantly, the court of appeals held that a lawyer's
duty to decline to represent a client is no different when the attorney
is appointed by the court than it would be if the client walked in off
the street:
Clearly, the ethics of the legal profession demand that any
attorney, private or public, decline to represent a party when
such attorney is unable, for valid reasons, to fully and ade-
quately prepare such party's case, or when such party is already
represented by competent counsel. Failure of an attorney to de-
cline to perform such representation may result in disciplinary
34. Id. at 632.
35. Id. (emphasis original).
36. 48 Ohio App. 2d 191, 356 N.E.2d 505 (1976).
1987]
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measures being taken against him.8"
Since the duty to decline employment arises from such a
complex matrix of ethical judgments by the attorney involved, it is
difficult to imagine any circumstances in which a court would be
justified in substituting its judgment for that of the attorney.
Once a lawyer declines to accept appointment, his or her with-
drawal requires the court to appoint another lawyer. The objection
of the client to this arrangement should be clearly noted for the rec-
ord. In effect, the client has been deprived of his chosen counsel sim-
ply because the utilization of forfeiture procedures compelled chosen
counsel to withdraw. The issue now posed is, even assuming the for-
feiture procedure was unconstitutional, will any sixth amendment vi-
olation be "cured" by the appointment of alternative counsel? That
question should be of interest to counsel contemplating withdrawal,
since he or she may be in a unique position to make the record nec-
essary to preserve the client's rights.
Where chosen counsel is compelled to withdraw by the grant of
a motion to disqualify, the United States Supreme Court held the
order could not be appealed prior to trial in Flanagan v. United
States.8 In urging that such orders should be immediately subject to
appeal, the question was raised whether post-judgment appeal is an
inadequate remedy, because a standard of "harmless error" would be
applied. In other words, would someone deprived of chosen counsel
be required to show that substitute counsel was so inadequate as to
cause a result different than was expected if represented by chosen
counsel? Such a burden could rarely be met. In responding to this
question, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted that some denials of
sixth amendment rights require no showing of prejudice because
prejudice is assumed. She offered three examples: 9
(1) Denial of the right to self-representation; 0
(2) Denial of the appointment of counsel altogether;"'
(3) Denial of counsel's request to be replaced because of a
conflict of interest.42
In each of these situations, the protected right goes beyond concern
37. Id. at 193, 356 N.E.2d at 507 (emphasis original).
38. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
39. Id. at 267-68.
40. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,
177 n.8 (1984).
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
[Vol. 27
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for the objective fairness of the proceeding. On the other hand, Jus-
tice O'Connor suggested that some disqualifications of counsel might
require a showing of prejudice for reversal and thus "cannot be ade-
quately reviewed until trial is complete."4 While no examples of the
latter category were offered, there is a strong implication that the
disqualification in question in Flanagan itself might present such an
issue. In Flanagan, four Philadelphia police officers who were
jointly indicted insisted on being represented by the same retained
law firm. Despite the clients' willingness to waive the conflict, the
court disqualified counsel from further representation of any of the
four officers.
Flanagan, however, did not involve a total deprivation of choice
of counsel. The clients were left in the position of simply being de-
nied joint representation by the same retained counsel. The order
only required that each client choose separate retained counsel. This
is very different from an order which deprives the client of any right
of choice, foisting an appointed lawyer upon him in lieu of his cho-
sen retained counsel.
The significance of the difference becomes readily apparent in
United States v. Rankin." In Rankin, the defendant's retained
counsel was detained in a lengthy murder trial in state court." The
federal trial judge ordered the defendant to obtain alternate counsel
and he refused, insisting on his original choice of retained counsel.
The judge then appointed counsel, allowing one month to prepare
the case. By the time the trial was actually concluded, defendant's
retained counsel had completed the state trial and was again availa-
ble. The court held that the refusal to continue the trial was
arbitrary and deprived the defendant of his right to counsel of his
choice.
Rankin did select counsel but was denied representation at
trial by that lawyer. That this deprivation occurred as a result
of the court's refusal to grant a continuance does not obscure the
nature of the right at stake. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3
(1954).
We have stated that "the most important decision a defend-
ant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney."
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55 (3rd Cir. 1979). "At-
torneys are not fungible," and "[tihe ability of a defendant to
43. 465 U.S. at 268-69.
44. 779 F.2d 956 (3rd Cir. 1986).
45. Retained counsel was former Philadelphia District Attorney F. Emmett Fitzpatrick,
who represented the defendant on appeal.
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select his own counsel permits him to choose an individual in
whom he has confidence." Id. at 56. Recognizing the impor-
tance of these interests, we held "[i]f a defendant chooses a par-
ticular lawyer, a court may not take arbitrary action prohibiting
the effective use of that counsel." Id. at 5746
As might be expected, the prosecution argued that the error in de-
priving the defendant of chosen counsel was harmless, since
appointed counsel provided competent representation at trial. In re-
jecting this argument, the court relied upon Flanagan, comparing
the denial of chosen counsel to a denial of the right of self-
representation:
The government argues that Rankin was competently rep-
resented by appointed counsel at trial. That, however, is not a
relevant consideration. A defendant who is arbitrarily deprived
of the right to select his own counsel need not demonstrate
prejudice .... In this respect, the denial of one's selected lawyer
is quite different from a claim of ineffective counsel where a
harmless error test is appropriate. The right at stake here is
similar to that of self-representation.
47
Returning to the scenario, retained counsel who contemplates
refusing assignment must be alert to the importance of the case being
in a posture which closely resembles Rankin. It should be clear that
counsel is not voluntarily withdrawing because continued representa-
tion would impose a financial burden. Counsel should indicate, on
the record, that ethical considerations preclude continued representa-
tion, that those ethical problems rise solely by virtue of the pending
claim of forfeiture of attorneys' fees, and that those ethical considera-
tions are not alleviated by the proffered appointment. The record
should also clearly show that the client objects to withdrawal of his
chosen counsel, refuses to select alternative counsel, and objects to
the appointment of alternative counsel. Thus, the record will clearly
reflect the actual circumstances: by the simple expedient of alleging
forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the prosecution is being given a veto over
the defendant's choice of counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
The allegation that fees which a defendant has paid to his re-
tained attorney should be forfeited, injects factual issues into a crimi-
nal case that cannot be litigated by retained counsel without serious
46. 779 F.2d at 958.
47. Id. at 960.
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conflicts of interest and conflicting roles. These conflicts are not alle-
viated by converting retained counsel into an appointed lawyer. Each
lawyer who faces this dilemma must decide for himself or herself
whether to accept the proffered appointment. There are serious risks
and hazards implicit in either course. It is essential, however, that
the ethical and tactical implications be fully explored before the
choice is made. Ultimately, there is hope that the courts will con-
tinue to respond to the dilemma by squelching its creation. The rea-
son forfeiture of attorneys' fees violates the sixth amendment is pre-
cisely because it creates this dilemma.
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